The Supreme Court of Alabama upheld the enforceability of an arbitration agreement by granting a nursing home’s motion to compel arbitration, finding that the resident’s wife had not sufficiently demonstrated the resident’s incapacity at the time of signing. Mobile Nursing & Rehabilitation Center v. Sliman, SC-2025-0303 (Ala. Oct. 17, 2025).
Ernest Sliman was admitted to Mobile Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC (MNRC) for rehabilitation after several falls. Ernest, who was 84 years old, had a history of dementia. When Ernest was admitted to MNRC, his wife, Jeanne, met with MNRC staff and executed an optional jury trial waiver and arbitration agreement stating that she was Ernest’s authorized representative. The agreement stated that all disputes would be resolved exclusively by binding arbitration. Ernest resided at MNRC from May 19, 2023, until June 4, 2023, when his family removed him after he developed a sacral pressure wound that became septic. He was admitted to the hospital, where he died on July 13, 2023, allegedly as a result of the infection.
As the personal representative of Ernest’s estate, Jeanne filed a complaint against MNRC alleging medical negligence. The complaint asserted that at the time of his admission to MNRC, Ernest was incompetent and incapable of making decisions for himself, had previously been diagnosed with dementia, and had remained in that condition during his admission. MNRC filed a motion to compel arbitration, but after a hearing, the trial court denied its motion. MNRC appealed.
The Supreme Court of Alabama, in a de novo review, noted its precedent that a nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement generally cannot be forced to arbitrate claims but that an exception to that rule applies when arbitration agreements are executed between a nursing home and a resident or a resident’s family members. To avoid being bound to arbitrate, Jeanne had the burden of proving that Ernest was either permanently or temporarily incapacitated at the time she signed the arbitration agreement.
The court further relied on its precedent that a chronic dementia diagnosis alone is not equivalent to permanent incapacity; such a diagnosis does not preclude the possibility of lucid intervals when an individual is capable of granting another the authority to act on their behalf or ratifying actions taken on their behalf.
The court determined that Jeanne had not proved that Ernest was permanently incapacitated at the time of his admission to MNRC. Rather, the evidence showed that Ernest’s dementia was primarily related to his short-term memory loss and related confusion but that he remembered immediate family members and how to contact them by telephone, was able to engage in activities he enjoyed, and could be left alone for six to eight hours per day.
Further, the court found that Jeanne had not adequately shown that Ernest was temporarily incapacitated at the precise time she signed the arbitration agreement. Although medical records were submitted as evidence, none of them were prepared on the date Jeanne signed the agreement. Records documenting Ernest’s condition on the following day indicated that he was not cognitively impaired but, instead, was alert and able to communicate his needs and preferences.
Therefore, the court found that the trial court had erred in denying MNRC’s motion to compel arbitration. It reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
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