The Nevada Supreme Court upheld a district court’s ruling that an intestacy statute specifying that an estate must be distributed to the next of kin in equal degree required a per capita without representation distribution. In re Ulvang, No. 89422, 2026 WL 695035 (Nev. Mar. 12, 2026).
William Ulvang died intestate, leaving an estate valued at $32 million. His wife predeceased him, and he had no children. The public administrator for William’s county identified his living first cousins as possible heirs and requested an order from the district court confirming that they were his legal heirs. Jamie Lipson, the child of a first cousin who had predeceased William, challenged the administrator’s request, arguing that section 134.070 of the Nevada Revised Statutes should be interpreted to provide for a per stirpes rather than a per capita without representation distribution scheme. The district court disagreed, concluding that section 134.070 required a per capita without representation distribution scheme. Therefore, William’s living first cousins were his sole heirs, and Jamie inherited nothing. Jamie appealed.
The Nevada Supreme Court noted that section 134.070 states that the estate of a decedent who died intestate must be distributed to “the next of kin in equal degree” and does not mention the terms per capita without representation or per stirpes. However, the court recognized the validity of its prior holding in In re McKay’s Estate, 184 P. 305 (Nev. 1919), in which the court had interpreted the statutory predecessor to section 134.070. In McKay, the court concluded that the phrase “the next of kin in equal degree” excluded all kin who were not in an equal degree of kinship to the decedent. In that case, which involved the decedent’s nieces, nephews, and a grandniece, the court determined that the grandniece was not in an equal degree of kinship as the nieces and nephews; therefore, the statute expressly prohibited the grandniece from inheriting. In the present case, the court determined that Jamie had not provided a compelling reason to overturn its ruling in McKay.
Further, the court determined that because section 134.070 requires a per capita without representation distribution, it was necessary to compute degrees of kinship. Section 134.150 of the Nevada Revised Statutes states that degrees of kinship must be computed according to the rules of civil law. Based upon the civil law method, William’s first cousins were fourth-degree collateral relatives, and Jamie, as a first cousin once removed, was a fifth-degree relative. Because William’s first cousins were lower degree relatives than Jamie, William’s estate would be distributed to them on a per capita without representation basis, and Jamie would receive nothing.
The court rejected Jamie’s argument that section 134.070 should be interpreted to require a per stirpes distribution because statutes adjacent to it contained per stirpes language. Although the McKay decision was over a century old, the legislature had never acted to clarify that the relevant statutory language required a per stirpes distribution; therefore, the court concluded that its failure to act was likely intentional.
Further, the court found no merit in Jamie’s contention that interpreting section 134.070 to require a per capita without representation distribution would lead to absurd or unreasonable results and entitle William’s first cousins to a windfall. The meaning of the statute was clear, and only the legislature—not the court—could amend it.
Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s decision.
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